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FINANCIAL SCREENING IN CRIMINAL CASES-
IMPRACTICAL AND IRRELEVANT
WILLIAM H. FORTUNE*
Judge Price was irritated. In April he had given Billy and Danny
Cowart a second continuance on assault and battery charges to give
them time to earn money to hire a lawyer. At that time he had ques-
tioned them and found them to be able-bodied, unmarried, and not
in school. There was no reason why they could not get jobs and earn
money for a lawyer, and Judge Price had made it clear that they were
not going to get free counsel in his court: "I will not require some
lawyer to come in here and work for nothing for you when you have
those two good arms (both of you) and are able to get out and work.
You can dig ditches; you can carry coal, or you can do something else.
. . . Next term of court . . . we will try [you] with or without a
lawyer."
But here it was, the September term of court, and Billy and Danny
again stood before the bench without a lawyer. Without giving the
boys a chance to explain, Judge Price lashed out: "I told you that
there are people (and I told you this before) who are dying for just
labor in this county. And if you haven't gone out and made money
and retained counsel, it is because you are either too lazy, or do not
want to work. And you will get convicted or acquitted on your own.
I will not appoint counsel for you." And the judge did not appoint
counsel and the Cowarts were convicted.
Why was Judge Price irritated? The charges were fairly minor
and Billy and Danny clearly should have been able to earn and save
enough money for a modest fee in the five-month period between
terms of court. After conviction they petitioned for habeas corpus and
Judge Price held a hearing, found them to have been "able-bodied
and capable of earning a living. . , not indigent . . . and not en-
titled to Court appointed counsel," and denied the writs. On appeal,
Billy and Danny won a new trial.' The Supreme Court of South Caro-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. A.B., 1961, LL.B., 1964,
University of Kentucky.
1. State v. Cowart, 251 S.C. 360, 162 S.E.2d 535 (1968).
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lina sympathized with Judge Price's annoyance at the Cowarts' conduct
but pointed out that the test is not whether the defendant should have
been able to employ an attorney but whether he is in fact able to
do so. Judge Price had not inquired into the defendants' present abil-
ity to retain counsel at the September term, and at the hearing on
the petition for habeas corpus the defendants testified that they had
scarcely worked during the April to September period and had no way
of raising the $300 fee of the attorney they had contacted. In short,
the Cowarts could not at the time of trial afford an attorney and Judge
Price should have appointed one.
If an identical case came before Judge Price after the appellate
court's decision in State v. Cowart, what would his options be? Sup-
pose it is again the April term and before the bench stand two unem-
ployed but employable men accused of aggravated assault. The judge
will have two alternatives: appoint counsel and proceed to trial or
continue the case on the bluff of trying the defendants next term "with
or without a lawyer." It is likely he will choose to continue the case
with an accompanying lecture on the self-esteem which accompanies
hard work and paying one's own way in society, unless he knows from
past experience that there is little chance of these defendants being
affected by homily or threat. Judge Price would agree that it is unfair
that the man who believes the threat or accepts the moral of the
homily will spend his own money for an attorney while recalcitrant
defendants like the Cowarts ultimately receive free counsel. But what
else can a judge do? An obvious answer is to be honest at the first
hearing and tell the defendants that a continuance is being ordered
to give them a chance to employ an attorney, but that if they are un-
able to do so counsel will be appointed. Then those who earn and
save money and hire a lawyer will be doing so because they feel they
should, not because they believe they will be tried without counsel
if they do not. But -this is hardly a satisfactory answer to a judge
who believes that those who should be able to pay must, if possible,
be made to do so.
Public support of criminal legal aid in the United States has al-
ways been theoretically conditioned on acceptance, by those who ap-
point counsel, of Judge Price's premise: those who can contribute to
the cost of their defense must do so.2 Legislatures have recently pro-
2. Four reports are extremely important to an understanding of the history of
criminal legal aid in the United States: (1) PovERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss4/3
Vol. 1973:821] FINANCIAL SCREENING IN CRIMINAL CASES
vided tools for exacting contribution from defendants, notably provi-
sions for contribution by the defendant as a condition of appointment
of counsel3 and for recoupment of defense costs after trial.4  If South
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL's COMMITTEE ON
POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRINL JUSTICE (1963) [hereinafter cited as
ALLEN REPORT]. This report was the product of a two-year study by a blue ribbon
committee chaired by Professor Francis Allen of the University of Michigan. The
committee's study of legal assistance in criminal cases in federal courts sparked the
passage of the Federal Criminal Justice Act of 1964, Pub. L No. 88-455, 78
Stat. 552 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1970)); (2) SUBcOMMITTEE ON CON-
STITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 90TH CONG.,
2D SESS., THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT IN THE FEnERAL DISTIUCT CouRTs (Comm. Print
1969) [hereinafter cited as OAKS REPORT]. Professor Dallin Oaks of the University
of Chicago was commissioned by the Senate Judiciary Committee to study the opera-
tion of the Criminal Justice Act. His report served as the basis for the 1969 amend-
ments to the Act and contains a wealth of information about the administration of
the federal criminal justice system; (3) L. SWLvERSTErN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN
CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN STATE COURTS (1965) [hereinafter cited as SILVERSTEIN].
In 1962 the American Bar Foundation undertook to study the status of criminal legal aid
in the United States. The study, headed by Lee Silverstein of the Foundation staff,
culminated in a three-volume report in 1965; (4) AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT
ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO DEFENSE
SERVIcEs (Approved Draft, 1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA REPORT]. Drawing heav-
ily on Silverstein's findings, the ABA Advisory Committee on Prosecution and Defense
Functions, chaired by Warren Burger, promulgated standards for defense services in
1967 and the standards were approved by the ABA House of Delegates in 1968.
These four reports, which constitute the major sources of the present public position
on criminal legal aid, accept the premise that counsel ought to be made available at
public expense only for those who cannot afford to hire an attorney. See ABA RE-
PORT 53-55; ALLEN REPORT 40-41; OAKS REPORT 6, 23-43; SILvmsrEIN 105, 115-16.
The Allen Report and ABA Report acceptance of this premise may, however, represent
only a working hypothesis that financial screening is compatible with the social need
for a defense attorney. See notes 6 & 34 infra and accompanying text. See also NA-
TIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, COURTS
257 (1973): "An individual provided public representation should be required to pay
any portion of the representation that he is able to pay at the time."
For a comprehensive analysis of the state of criminal legal aid, see NATIONAL LE-
GAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE (1973) [hereinafter
cited as OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE]. This report is the product of an intensive field
study in twenty randomly selected jurisdictions and a comprehensive mail survey of
all 3110 counties in the United States. Id. at 1. The report takes no position on
whether the defendant should be made to pay, commenting only that "the social cost
of denying adequate representation to an accused may ultimately outweigh the savings
which accrue from the occasional exclusion of one who could afford to obtain these
services." Id. at 62.
3. Criminal Justice Act of 1964, § 6, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(f) (1970, Supp. H,
1972).
4. Ky. REv. STAT. § 31.050 (1972); N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:158A-17 (1971); ORE.
REv. STAT. § 161.665 (1971), construed in State v. Fuller, - Ore. -, 504 P.2d 1393
(1973).
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Carolina were to provide Judge Price with these tools he might employ
them against future defendants who rejected the value of working to
pay a lawyer's fee. He might, however, find the tools to be ineffec-
tive and impractical, as have other courts.; What Judge Price and
a decreasing number of judges who share his priorities believe is that
it is more important that the defendant pay his own way than that
he be represented at trial. Increasingly, however, the judiciary (ap-
pellate judges, some trial judges, and those who purport to speak for
or on behalf of the judiciary) believe that it is far more important
that the defendant have an attorney at trial; it has become axiomatic
that the interests of society and the criminal justice system require that
in all but the most routine cases the defendant be represented.0 What
5. Contribution provisions have generally not been used because of the adminis-
trative burden on the courts. See text accompanying note 25 infra. Recoupment pro-
visions have been generally criticized as ineffective and, if made a condition of proba-
tion, harsh and perhaps unconstitutional. See 56 MARQ. L. Rlv. 551 (1973) (criticiz-
ing State v. Foust, 14 N.C. App. 382, 185 S.E.2d 718 (1972), which upheld reimburse-
ment of defense costs as a condition of probation). The California Supreme Court
held the reimbursement provision of that state's statute to be an unconstitutional im-
pediment to counsel. In re Allen, 71 Cal. 2d 388, 455 P.2d 143, 78 Cal. Rptr. 207
(1969). See also Note, Eligibility and Reimbursement under the New Jersey Public
Defender Statute, 7 Hv. J. LFGIS. 449, 459-66 (1970), for a criticism of the lien
and reimbursement provisions of the New Jersey statute. On the practical side, as the
commentator points out, id. at 464, in the first two years of operation the revenue
from reimbursement was less than 1% of the budget.
6. The Supreme Court's concern that the defendant be represented is evidenced
in many cases, most notably Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), and Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). The Court's concern for the defendant is nowhere
better expressed than in Justice Sutherland's opinion for the Court in Powell:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill
in the science of the law. If charged with crime he is incapable, generally,
of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is un-
familiar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may
be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evi-
dence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks
both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though
he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step
in the proceedings against him.
Id. at 69. Of late, expressions of the need for defense counsel stress the social need for
representation. E.g., ALLEN REPORT 10:
In the modern era it is not always fully understood that the adversary system
performs a vital social function and is the product of long historical expe-
rience. The state trials in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England demon-
strated that a system of justice that provides inadequate opportunities to chal-
lenge official decisions is not only productive of injuries to individuals, but
is itself a threat to the state's security and to the larger interests of the com-
munity. The adversary system is the institution devised by our legal order
for the proper reconciliation of public and private interests in the crucial areas
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss4/3
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has gone largely unnoticed and unarticulated is the conflict between
this overriding consideration and the historic premise of legal aid, re-
flected in almost all legal assistance statutes, that an attorney will be
appointed only for those defendants who cannot afford their own.7  If
it is in the interest of society that the defendant have an attorney,
then society should not refuse to appoint counsel because the defend-
ant can afford to hire a lawyer but has not done so. If the conflict
has largely gone unnoticed, however, the actions of both trial and ap-
pellate courts reveal that the conflict does exist and that it is almost
always resolved in favor of representation.
The first point of conflict is at the defendant's initial court appear-
ance for arraignment or preliminary hearing. The court will typically
have many cases to hear and will be concerned with expediting a
of penal regulation. As such, it makes essential and invaluable contributions
to the maintenance of the free society.
The essence of the adversary system is challenge. The survival of our system
of criminal justice and the values which it advances depends upon a constant,
searching, and creative questioning of official decisions and assertions of au-
thority at all stages of the process. The proper performance of the defense
function is thus as vital to the health of the system as the performance of
the prosecuting and adjudicatory functions.
The ABA Report states that the fundamental premise of the standards relating to de-
fense services "is that representation by counsel is desirable in criminal cases both from
the viewpoint of the defendant and of society." ABA REPORT 3. Finally, Chief Jus-
tice Burger, commenting on the standards in 1970, remarked:
Another thing emerged very early and that was that a system of criminal jus-
tice must be regarded much as we would regard a tripod or three-legged stool.
It must have three parts, and they must all be strong. The one obvious part,
of course, is the judge. No one has ever questioned the need for a prosecutor.
But until the last twenty or twenty-five years, there was some doubt about
whether this third leg [defense counsel] was essential. We concluded very
quickly that that third leg in this context was as essential as the third leg
of a stool. We have not quite said that it ought to be jurisdictional that you
have three parts to this enterprise but we have come very, very close to it.
Proceedings of the Thirty-First Annual Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia
Circuit, 51 F.R.D. 25, 40 (1970) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as 31st D.C.
Judicial Conference].
7. There is evidence that the ABA Advisory Committee on Prosecution and De-
fense Functions saw the conflict. Herman Pollock of the Philadelphia Defender Asso-
ciation and a member of the Committee, has remarked:
The question to which the committee was not ready to address itself is
whether the obligation of Government is fully met if free defense services are
not made available to all who wish to have them without regard to financial
considerations. Implicit in this concept is the recognition that financial status
is indeed an irrelevancy and that society benefits from a system of criminal
justice in which defense, no less than prosecution, is deemed to be a public
obligation available to all.
31st D.C. Judicial Conference 44-45.
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crowded docket. If the defendant does not have an attorney, it serves
the system to appoint one (often an assistant public defender is pres-
ent in the courtroom) for the limited purpose of representation at the
hearing. An inquiry into the defendant's financial resources would
not only delay the immediate proceedings but might result in a con-
tinuance of the case. Routine misdemeanor and juvenile cases are
likewise expedited by appointment of the public defender without
inquiry into ability to pay. These cases may often 'be heard immedi-
ately, and a continuance solely to force the defendant to hire his
own attorney seems ill-advised if for no other reason than the incon-
venience to the witnesses who have been called to testify.8 What evi-
dence there is suggests strongly that in routine misdemeanors and ju-
venile cases, and in preliminary hearings in felony cases, the courts,
which need to expedite cases to keep the system working, do not at-
tempt to screen out defendants who could hire a lawyer.'
The second point of conflict is in the nature of the inquiry into abil-
ity to pay if one is made. The premise that those who can afford
to contribute must contribute contemplates much more than the simple
question, "Do you have funds with which to employ an attorney?"
Detailed questioning and select investigation of assets and liabilities,
resources, and expenditures is necessary before an informed decision
can be made whether the defendant should pay for all or part of his
8. Dallin Oaks has described the process in Boys' Court in Chicago as follows:
The branches to which the municipal defenders were assigned are relatively
informal high volume operations. Both the prosecution and the defense are
conducted with little or no preparatory work outside the courtroom. Many
of the cases fit into familiar factual patterns, such as the teenagers one fre-
quently sees brought into Boys Court for riding in a "borrowed" automobile.
The repetitive factual situations in many of the cases and the high volume
invite mass production methods by the prosecution and the defense. The de-
fenders typically waited in an anteroom to the court, or at the bar, until a
case was called in which their service was needed. Except in an unusual case,
the defender proceeded to trial on the spot, after only a moment or two of
hurried conversation with the defendant. Although the defenders did not
want cases that might deprive a practicing lawyer of a fee, representation was
frequently undertaken without either formal judicial inquiry into indigency
(the absence of retained counsel apparently being taken as the equivalent of
indigence) or formal court appointment.
D. OAns & W. LEmaAN, A CnMNAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND Hm INDmEN 123-24
(1968).
9. In a 1961 California field study it was concluded that to expedite the docket,
judges in metropolitan areas may appoint the public defender over the accused's protests
that he is able to retain counsel or that he has retained counsel. Note, Representation
of Indigents in California-A Field Study of the Public Defender and Assigned Coun-
sel Systems, 13 SrA. L. Rnv. 522, 546 (1961).
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defense. It is possible to generalize about the inquiry which should
be made if there is to be a good faith attempt to screen out those
defendants who can afford an attorney. The concept of "affording"
involves three variables: resources, the cost of the desired item, and
the cost of what must be purchased before the desired item is pur-
chased. When the desired item is an attorney for one's defense in
a criminal trial, it might be concluded that there is no expenditure more
important-that is, that there is nothing which must be purchased first.
A humane system will not, however, require an accused to deprive
his family of the necessities of life to hire a lawyer, and recent verbali-
zations of the test of eligibility take into account personal and family
needs.' 0 The inquiry should quantify resources and necessities to ar-
rive at available resources, which can then be compared with the cost
of an attorney.
Is it practical for a court to make such an inquiry?11 To arrive
at a sum representing resources, there must be a calculation not only
of cash but of convertible real and personal property, valued after sub-
tracting debts secured by liens, at the estimated price the goods would
bring at a forced sale. While the court cannot take into account prior
earnings in estimating resources,1 2 it would be proper to include pros-
pective earnings to the date of trial. In calculating what must be sub-
10. The wording differs, but the meaning is identical in Oaks' test and the ABA
test: "A defendant is 'financially unable to obtain counsel' . . . when the value of
his income expected prior to the anticipated date of trial [is] insufficient, after he has
provided himself and his dependents with the necessities of life, to permit him to retain
a qualified lawyer." OAKS REPORT 6; "Counsel should be provided to any person who
is financially unable to obtain adequate representation without substantial hardship to
himself or his family." ABA REPORT 53.
11. The factors which can be considered are listed in Morgan v. Rhay, 78 Wash. 2d
116, 119, 470 P.2d 180, 182-83 (1970):
a) seriousness of the charge
b) prevailing and applicable bar association fee schedules
c) availability and convertibility of any personal or real property owned
d) outstanding debts and liabilities
e) accused's past and present history
f) earning capacity
g) living expenses
h) credit standing in the community
i) family and dependentsj) any other circumstances which may impair or enhance his ability to
hire a lawyer
For an excellent analysis of these factors in the context of the Louisiana legal assist-
ance statute, see Comment. Balance Sheet of Appointed Counsel in Louisiana Criminal
Cases, 34 LA. L. REv. 88 (1973).
12. People v. Griffin, 22 Mich. App. 101, 177 N.W.2d 213 (1970).
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tracted from resources as representing necessities of the defendant and
his family, the court should set apart to the defendant, as a minimum,
real or personal property declared by statute to be "necessities of life"
and exempt from execution.' The court should subtract from pros-
pective earnings what the family needs to subsist-as a minimum, the
percentage of earnings declared by federal or state statute to be
exempt from execution. After subtracting necessities from resources,
the court should estimate the cost of the legal services that the defendant
will require.' 4 If the costs exceed available resources, the defend-
ant "qualifies for legal aid;" that is, the state must assist him in paying
for his costs of counsel. The judge, or the court functionary making
the inquiry, should not only obtain an affidavit from the defendant
but should selectively check, or cause to be checked, the accuracy of
the information elicited. 15
Does the process described appear workable? If so, the description
has successfully concealed the variables which make the inquiry, if
conscientious, at least as exhaustive as the examination for approval
of a wage earner's plan under chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Act.' 0
In evaluating resources and necessities, what is to be done about in-
stallment debts? What is to be done with overdue bills, and does
it matter that the creditor is not pressing for payment or that the ex-
penditure was originally for a luxury? In evaluating prospective earn-
13. In Arroya v. Baker, 427 F.2d 73 (10th Cir. 1970), the Tenth Circuit held
unconstitutional, under Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), a New Mexico
state judge's requirement that a defendant be a pauper-a man without any money or
means-in order to be eligible for appointment of counsel. In James v. Strange, 407
U.S. 128 (1972), the Supreme Court held a Kansas statute providing for recoupment
of defense costs unconstitutional, under the equal protection clause, because the statute
did not afford the defendant the same exemptions he would have had in an ordinary
civil action. Cf. Gaston v. State, 106 So. 2d 622, 623-24 (Fla. App. 1958). In the
analogous matter of providing the costs of appeal, the Florida court held that under
a test of "insolvency" the defendant was not required to "subject the homestead or
the reasonable furnishings of the family home to sale or pledge to provide the costs
of appeal." Id. at 624.
14. This is a particularly thorny problem. Bolds v. Bennett, 159 N.W.2d 425
(Iowa 1968), indicates that a court should be guided by the prospective fee of the
attorney the defendant would choose but, as pointed out in State v. Sands, 2 Ore. App.
575, 580, 469 P.2d 795, 798 (1970), this would permit any defendant to "postpone
the day of reckoning by seeking counsel who would require more cash in advance than
the client had in the bank." Oaks concluded that eligibility must be tied to average costs
and standard billing practices in the district. OAxs REPORT 25.
15. ABA REPORT 57-58; OArs REPORT 39-43.
16. 11 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1970).
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ings, is the court to assume the defendant will not be laid off? Few
defendants will hold jobs in which there is job security even for those
who are not facing criminal charges. How is the court to evaluate
the prospective earnings of one who is unemployed at the time of in-
quiry? Should the capacity to borrow be assessed as a resource and,
if so, should the court require a defendant to encumber himself be-
yond a future trial date?17  In forecasting the cost of the attorney's
fee, is the court to assume that the case will be plea-bargained or
tried? What is the court to assume about investigation and prepara-
tion, and about the billing practices of the as-yet-unnamed attorney
of a defendant's choice?
If a judge or court administrator were to decide to devote the time
necessary for a detailed inquiry and spot investigation, and if the treat-
ment of the variables above could be standardized to produce consis-
tent results, what would those results be? The pool of interviewees
would be those accused of felonies or serious misdemeanors who had
not retained an attorney prior to the interview and who said that they
could not afford to hire an attorney. Of this group it is submitted
that a high percentage-at least 60%-would have no available re-
sources and would thus qualify for representation at the expense of
the state. Most of those remaining-at least 30% of the original
group--would have some available resources but not enough to pay
the cost of counsel. These defendants would qualify for state help
but would be required to contribute to their defense. The remaining
group--10% at the most-would be denied legal assistance and told
that they must employ their own attorneys. 18
17. Credit standing was specifically listed in Morgan v. Rhay, 78 Wash. 2d 116, 119,
470 P.2d 180, 182-83 (1970), as a factor to be taken into account. See note 11 supra.
18. Informed estimates of the percentage of criminal defendants in need of assist-
ance have been around 50% to 60%. E.g., SpECiAL CommiTrrEE OF THE Ass'lr OF
THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK AND THE NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER
ASS'N, EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE ACCUSED 38-39 (1959) (60%); OTHER FACE OF
JUSTICE 71 (felons-47%; misdemeanants-65%); SiLVERSTEIN 10 (66%); Report
of the Conference on Legal Manpower Needs of Criminal Law, 41 F.R.D. 389, 397
(1966) (at least 50%) [hereinafter cited as Legal Manpower Needs].
These estimates, however, should be updated to take into account more liberal con-
cepts of need, particularly the effect of excluding property declared to be exempt from
execution. The Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (1970,
Supp. II, 1972), exempts three-fourths of a wage earner's wages from garnishment. Id.
* 1673. Many states have amended their garnishment statutes to provide protection
substantially similar to that provided in the federal act. See id. § 1675. The clear impli-
cation of James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972), is that the defendant cannot be re-
quired to use exempt earnings to defend himself.
Vol. 1973:821]
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The court's job would not, however, be over after the initial qualifi-
cation.19 Any order of eligibility or noneligibility would be subject
to modification on a showing of changed conditions. The court would
have to inquire periodically of those who had been denied counsel
to attempt to persuade or coerce them to hire a lawyer before the
trial date. The court would have to administer the contributions from
those adjudged to be partially eligible, dunning those who had missed
installments.
Courts simply do not do these things. In his study for the Ameri-
can Bar Association completed in 1965, Lee Silverstein found that
The estimates do not reflect the high cost of defense counsel. 'What competent crim-
inal lawyers charge is rarely studied; what studies there are indicate that fees in felony
cases are beyond the means of most people. For example, the fees for defending a
Dyer Act charge, as reported in the Oaks study, varied from $1000 to $5000 in New
York and Chicago to about $250 in western Wisconsin. OArS REPORT 25. The Michi-
gan State Bar Schedule was used in the 1969 Report to the National Defender Confer-
ence to illustrate that criminal defense fees are beyond the means of the middle class.
The minimum fee for a felony was $750, or $300 per day for court time plus $30
per hour for consultation and preparation. NATIONAL DEFENDER PROJECT OF? TiE NA-
TIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, REPORT TO THE NATIONAL DEFENDER CON-
FERENCE 48 (1969) [hereinafter cited as REPORT TO THE NATIONAL DEFENDER CON-
FERENCE].
The latest statistics of the Director of the Administrative Office of United States
Courts show that for fiscal 1972 there were 47,043 original criminal filings in the dis-
trict courts. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
Tim UNITED STATES CouRTS 133 (1972) (Table 29). The same report indicates that
in fiscal 1972 there were 5496 cases assigned to federal public defenders, id. at 486,
1550 cases assigned to community defender organizations, id. at 487, and 24,812 cases
assigned to private attorneys. Id. at 489-93 (Table 83, subtracting from the total of
adult and juvenile defendants the number of appointments in the superior and juvenile
courts of the District of Columbia). There were thus 31,858 appointments in the dis-
trict courts, representing 67% of original filings. The economia profile of the federal
defendant is assumed to be substantially higher than that of the state defendant be-
cause of the selective nature of federal criminal jurisdiction. The Allen Report found
in 1964 that one-third of federal defendants required assistance, while 60% of state
defendants were estimated to be "indigent." ALLEN REPORT 16. The increase in the
percentage of federal defendants receiving appointments from one-third in 1964 to two-
thirds in 1972 illustrates the effect of a liberal standard and liberal administration on
the concept of need and provides a basis on which to assert that if similar concepts
were applied to state systems over 90% of defendants would be found to require as-
sistance. The 1973 estimate of the NLADA that 47% of felony defendants and 65%
of misdemeanor defendants require assistance is based on the returns from judges, re-
turns which reflect, to some extent, conservative standards for the granting of counsel.
See OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE 60-61.
19. The administrative burdens of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 are described
in OAxs REPORT 159-68. In districts with large caseloads the administrative burden
of simply checking forms and attorney vouchers is substantial.
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many judges resorted to litmus tests for eligibility, the most prevalent
of these tests being to deny counsel if the defendant has posted
bond."0 Although most judges claimed they took into account many
factors, the overall impression from Silverstein's study is of a lack of
system and standards and a prevalence of arbitrary decisions. 21  In
a 1973 study of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association it
was found that over one-half of reporting judges still use the defend-
ant's ability to post bond as a precluding factor in at least some cases,
and that the judges varied greatly in their assessment of the impor-
tance to be attributed to selected factors in the questionnaire.2 2  Other
studies suggest, however, that, perhaps because of the lack of system
and standards, courts tend to err on the side of appointing counsel.23
Judges might thus resort to the practical test of telling the defendant
he is not qualified in order to determine if he is able to hire a lawyer,
but ultimately appointing a lawyer if the defendant does not retain
counsel.24  If it is not practical to conduct the kind of inquiry and
20. SILVERSTEIN 108-09. Refusing to appoint counsel because the defendant is out
on bond has without exception been damned by appellate courts confronted with the
issue. Williams v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. App. 2d 666, 38 Cal. Rptr. 291 (1964);
People v. Eggers, 27 Ill. 2d 85, 188 N.E.2d 30 (1963); Sizemore v. Commonwealth,
450 S.W.2d 497 (Ky. 1970); see ABA REPORT 53-55; SiLvEnsrnN 116.
21. SIL% ERSTEIN 105-09. The absence of standards has been recently noted in an
ABA monograph: "The absence of uniform standards, particularly in determining eligi-
bility and in selecting counsel, means there is a substantial diversity in the quality,
quantity, and adequacy of service provided." B. CtulAN, LEGAL SmVIcES FOR SPECIAL
GRoups 3 (1972).
22. OTHER FACE OF JusTicE 60-61.
23. In a 1962 study of appointments in the federal courts it was found that in
more than three-fourths of the districts there was no investigation of indigency beyond
perfunctory questioning by the judge. Note, The Representation of Indigent Criminal
Defendants in the Federal District Courts, 76 HARv. L. REv. 579, 585 (1963). Writing
on the Criminal Justice Act in 1967, Judge William Timbers of the District of Connec-
ticut stated that "invariably, in every case of an accused without retained counsel, at
least at the onset, discretion is exercised liberally in favor of the accused by determin-
ing that he is financially unable to obtain counsel." Timbers, Judicial Perspectives on
the Operation of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 55, 56 (1967).
That counsel is appointed approximately 67% of the time in federal courts, see note
18 supra, strongly suggests that the federal courts are liberal in appointing counsel.
In a 1972 field study in Alabama, it was found that the basic standard for determin-
ing indigency was for the judge to accept the defendant's word on the matter. Only
3% of the entire sample of judges, attorneys, and prosecutors polled responded that
investigations were ever conducted, and only 9% of the sample responded that judges
even questioned defendants on their ability to pay. Note, The Echoes of Gideon and
Reverberations of Argersinger: Legal Representation of Indigent Criminal Defendants
in Alabama, 25 ALA. L. REv. 229, 253 (1972).
24. Oaks noted that a few United States Commissioners apply this practical test
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investigation which would, with a high degree of accuracy, screen out
the non-needy-and it is submitted it is not practical---courts will con-
tinue to make uninformed decisions, ultimately resolving doubts in fa-
vor of appointment.
A third point of conflict, suggested by the discussion above, is the
use (or nonuse) of the provisions in legal assistance statutes for the de-
fendant -to contribute to the cost of his defense. It is assumed that
there are many defendants who could contribute something to the cost
of their defense, and most of the recently enacted legal assistance stat-
utes contain a provision for contribution.2 5  These provisions simply
have not been utilized, possibly because no one wants to bother with
collecting installments from the defendant. Propriety seems to require
that this be done by the court rather than the appointed attorney or
defender, and the courts have not been willing to undertake the task.
The Federal Criminal Justice Act has contained a confribution provi-
sion since 1964.26 The reports of the Administrator of Courts show
by denying the defendant's application but leaving the way open for the defendant to
reapply if he cannot retain an attorney. OAxs REPORT 32.
25. Criminal Justice Act of 1964, §§ 4, 6, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3006A(d), (e) (1970).
For typical state statutes, see note 4 supra.
26. See note 24 supra. The legislative history of the Act indicates that the contri-
bution provision was to be utilized. Attorney General Robert Kennedy's letter accom-
panying the bill concluded:
Finally, the proposal limits the benefits of the statute to persons financially
unable to obtain an adequate defense. The term "indigency" is avoided be-
cause of its implication that only an accused who is destitute may need ap-
pointed counsel or services. Experience demonstrates that many persons have
resources sufficient to defray part but not all of the expenses of their defense.
In order that representation may be furnished to the extent of each defend-
ant's need, we have proposed that partial payments may be required and that
the statute shall become operative at whatever stage of the proceeding the ac-
cused is found financially unable to obtain counsel or services necessary to
an adequate defense. At the same time the requirement of an "appropriate
inquiry" to determine the defendant's financial need is intended to assure that
the court, by hearing, affidavit or other suitable investigation, will scrutinize
all applications for representation.
Letter from Robert F. Kennedy to President John F. Kennedy, March 6, 1963, appen-
dixed to H.R. REP. No. 864, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
The failure of the federal courts to use the contribution provision has been criticized
by Professor Oaks on several occasions. Commenting in 1969 on the administration
of the Act, he indicated that "there is almost no evidence that courts and commission-
ers are making the Act work as intended for defendants who are 'marginally eligible'-
defendants who can pay some but not all the costs of their defense." Oaks, Improving
the Criminal Justice Act, 55 A.B.A.J. 217, 219 (1969). In his report Oaks classified
the problem of the partially eligible defendant as a matter of paramount importance
because of the necessity for obtaining the wholehearted cooperation of the bar. OAKs
REPORT 7.
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that the greatest amount received from federal defendants in a fiscal
year was $14,636 in 1967; this compares to an outlay of almost
$2,300,000 in the same year to appointed counsel." Some districts
have never used the contribution provision.28 Few reports are avail-
able on the use of state contribution provisions, but it is likely that
even less use will be made of such provisions at the state level, both
because of the lower economic status of state defendants and the
heavier criminal caseloads of the judges 9.2  Also, many states employ
basically a defender system in which it is difficult to calculate the cost
of defending any one person for the purpose of assessing that persons
fair contribution to his defense.
27. The Annual Reports of the Director of the Administrative Office of United
States Courts for 1970 and 1971 contain data on reimbursements by defendants for fis-
cal 1970 and 1971. In addition, the 1970 Annual Report contains reimbursement data
for fiscal 1966, 1967, 1968, and 1969. The 1972 Annual Report, which is the latest
report available, contains no reimbursement data. The data for the period 1966-1971
in the district courts are:
Fiscal Disbursements Reimbursement
Year to Attorneys from Defendants
1966 $1,872,740 $14,427b
1967 $2,365,482 $14,636a
1968 $2,873,077 $13,094d
1969 $3,145,288 $ 8,199e
1970 $3,817,249 $10,738f
1971a $2,011,748 $ 3,3769
a. As of June 30, 1971.
b. ANNuAL REPORT OF THE DIREcTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE UNrrED STATES COURTS 371 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as 1970 ANNUAL REPORT].
c. Id. at 367.
d. Id. at 363.
e. Id. at 359.
f. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 436 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as 1971 ANNuAL REPORT].
g. Id. at 441.
28. In the Eighth Circuit, for example, the tables show no reimbursements re-
ceived in the Eastern District of Missouri, Western District of Arkansas, Northern Dis-
trict of Iowa, or District of South Dakota in the fiscal years 1966 to 1971. 1970
ANNukL REPORT 358, 362, 366, 370; 1971 ANNUAL REPORT 434, 440.
The data in footnotes 26 & 27 supra is somewhat misleading, as money paid directly
to attorneys appointed under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 is not reflected in the
Administrator's reports of reimbursements. This information is not available and it is
not known in what districts money was paid directly to counsel. The total contributed
by defendants in this fashion is assumed to be relatively small, certainly not enough
to detract from Oaks' assertion that little use is being made of the contribution provi-
sion of the Act. See note 24 supra.
29. Only 8% of the over 2000 judges who responded to the 1973 NLADA ques-
tionnaire reported that legal aid in criminal cases was anything but an all or nothing
proposition. OTHER FAcE OF JUSTIcE 62, 75.
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The fourth point of conflict is the judge's appointment of counsel
at the time of trial for a defendant who has been judged ineligible
for appointed counsel but has not obtained his own attorney. The
judge is commanded by the statute, and the social ethic behind the
statute, not to appoint counsel. But the judge must try the case and
he does not want to try the man without counsel. He cannot hold
the defendant in contempt or revoke his bond.80 The only way he
can punish the defendant for his failure to do what he should have
done is to try him without an attorney. But this is an unacceptable
solution for several reasons. First is the judge's fear of disruption and,
short of that, dislike for a proceeding which does not conform to the
settled modes of adversary proceedings. Neither judge nor prosecutor
likes to be put in the position of protecting a defendant who is ignorant
of the rules and strategies of trial practice. Secondly, there may be
genuine concern that an injustice will be done because the layman
lacks the ability to present his proof properly or because the jury
will react adversely to the defendant's extemporaneous statements.
Thirdly, the judge will be reluctant to try a man without counsel for
fear that, in so doing, he will be providing the defendant with colorable
grounds for collateral attack on any conviction obtained. Finally, a
judge who has all or part of the responsibility for the decision-either
the sentence alone or the verdict and sentence-will recoil at the
thought of sending someone to the penitentiary who has not had the
benefit of counsel. He may then overreact and give a sentence which
is lighter than the elicited facts warrant.81 For these reasons courts
30. Silverstein found manipulation of bail to assure representation. In Memphis
and Philadelphia if the defendant did not employ an attorney his bond was revoked
and the defender appointed. From a city in Minnesota it was reported that one of
the judges deliberately set bond so high that the defendant would not be able to obtain
a release. In a rural county in Oregon the judge would not permit anyone to be
bonded who did not have a lawyer! SiLvEas'rEiN 108.
31. For a colorful exposition of one trial judge's antipathy toward a trial with an
unrepresented defendant, see Laub, The Problem of the Unrepresented, Misrepresented
and Rebellious Defendant in Criminal Court, 2 DuQuESNE L. REv. 245, 247 (1964):
Piero Calamandrei recites that he once saw a boy pull off the antennae of
a black beetle which was then placed at the edge of a road. Deprived of
his exploratory organs, the mutilated insect swayed from side to side, turned
in circles and became overturned by blades of grass. 'This picture," said Cala-
mandrei, "is recalled to me whenever I think what the judicial process would
become if, as some people suggest, the lawyers, those sensitive antennae of
justice, were eliminated." The author of this statement might easily have
used for his illustration the lawyerless, pointless, hodgepodge trial of the
Knave of Hearts for the larceny of tarts, but he would, perhaps, have found
a more poignant answer to his implied concern had he been present at an
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are increasingly reluctant to proceed to trial with the defendant unrep-
resented. 2
Is it possible to reconcile appointment of counsel at the time of trial
with an earlier denial of counsel on the basis of the defendant's
means? Many lawyers and judges apparently feel that the defendant
has a duty to society to hire his own lawyer, which justifies an initial
denial of counsel on the bluff that the defendant will "be tried next
term of court with or without a lawyer." 3  They would accept the
proposition that the defense lawyer is a necessary ingredient of the
criminal justice system but would say that the defendant is obligated
to defray, if possible, the cost to society of his defense. It is a premise
of our accusatory system, however, that the defendant owes no duty
to society to cooperate in his own prosecution beyond giving nontesti-
American trial of a self-represented defendant charged with crime.
Laub likens the trial judge who lacks the ability to control the trial because of the
outbursts of a pro se defendant to "a corpse at a funeral, a necessary item to make
the affair a success but unable to fashion the proceedings to his liking." Id. at 248.
"[Mlany a trial judge supplements his crier's opening prayer with a muttered supplica-
tion of his own, '. . . and, please, God, let there be no unrepresented defendants in
court today."' Id. at 246.
32. In a series of recent cases the California courts have forced defendants who
wished to proceed pro se to accept the services of the public defender or appointed
counsel. People v. Rhinehart, 9 Cal. 3d 139, 507 P.2d 642, 107 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1973);
People v. Sharp, 7 Cal. 3d 448, 499 P.2d 489, 103 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 944 (1973); Magee v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. App. 3d 201, 109 Cal. Rptr.
758 (1973). See generally Note, The Right to Defend Pro Se in Criminal Proceedings,
1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 679. The California electorate voiced its distaste for pro se de-
fenses by amending the California constitution to permit the legislature to require the
defendant to be represented. CAL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 13. The legislature in the mean-
time had passed a bill, to become effective with the effective date of the constitutional
amendment, requiring counsel in all capital cases. CAL. PENAL CODE § 686.2 (Supp.
1973). The legislative history is capsulized in People v. Sharp, supra at 460, 499
P.2d at 499, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 243: "The Legislature also expressly found that 'persons
representing themselves cause unnecessary delays in the trials of charges against them;
that trials are extended by such persons representing themselves; and that orderly trial
procedures are disrupted.'"
The NLADA report expressed the societal interest in an orderly trial in this way:
"Counsel for the accused is essential to maintaining the integrity of the judicial process,
avoiding delay and preserving orderly procedures. The fundamental interest which the
public has in maintaining the orderly administration of criminal justice may thus com-
pel society to insure its preservation." OTHER FAcE oF JusicE 62.
33. This theme runs throughout Oaks' report, in which those defendants of means
who seek appointed counsel are referred to as "abusers" and "cheaters." OAKs REPORT
33-43. The quotes appearing in id. at 34 and SiLvERsTIN 109-10 are from a sampling
of lawyers and judges who are morally affronted by the defendant who does not want
to spend his own money for a lawyer.
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monial evidences4 and being orderly while in the courtroom.8Y
Furthermore, it would be anomalous to say that 'a defendant owes to
society the duty of defraying defense costs when society will not reim-
burse him for these costs if he is found innocent.
It is possible to conclude that there is no social need for representa-
tion until the time of trial. On this theory it would not be inconsistent
to deny counsel at the preliminary stages or on pleas of guilty, although
this rationale, if sound, would require judges to tell defendants that
counsel would be appointed for them for trial. The rationale is sound,
however, only if the social need for representation is narrowly defined.
The broader and more accepted view of the social need for representa-
tion is that a free society requires that the accused have an effective
means to challenge the prosecution at every critical stage of the pro-
ceedings. s6 Ours is an adversary system and if the defendant is not
represented, erroneous decisions may occur for which society as a
whole must share the blame. The judge, of course, assumes the im-
mediate responsibility that the decision be fair, and he will usually
be reluctant to accept a guilty plea from an unrepresented defendant.
Courts routinely appoint counsel for the purpose of advising a man
concerning a contemplated plea of guilty, without regard to his re-
sources.87  To require the defendant to hire an attorney would delay
34. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760-65 (1966), sets out the basic ra-
tionale of the Court's position that to require the defendant to participate in blood tests,
voicegraphs, lineups, and the like does not violate the self-incrimination clause of the
fifth amendment.
35. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
36. This concept is well expressed in the Allen Report in an excerpt quoted in
note 6 supra. See also ALLEN REPORT 40: "[S]olution of these problems is not essen-
tially a charitable enterprise undertaken to attain welfare objectives. On the contrary,
these problems involve fundamental issues of justice to the individual accused and the
larger public interests involved in the proper and vigorous operation of the adversary
system."
37. OAxs REPORT 82. To expedite the proceedings the court may appoint a lawyer
to advise the defendant even if the defendant says that he wants to plead guilty and
does not need a lawyer. There is a strong presumption against waiver of constitutional
rights and the Supreme Court has set out standards for waiver which should deter trial
judges from permitting an unrepresented defendant to plead guilty. In Von Moltke
v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724 (1947), the Court held that a valid waiver of the right
to counsel on a guilty plea requires that the defendant must understand the "charges,
the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments there-
under, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and
all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter." If reviewed,
the record must affirmatively show this understanding. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
238, 242 (1968).
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the disposition of the case and result in a very small fee to the retained
attorney. It is in the best interests of the system to appoint counsel
for the purpose of advising the defendant on his plea; the case can
be expedited while protecting society's interest that the defendant's
plea of guilty come after a lawyer's evaluation and advice.
Both the actions of trial courts and the decisions of appellate courts
support the generalization that there is an overriding social need for
the defendant to be represented at all critical stages of the proceeding.
The actions of trial courts in routinely appointing counsel at critical
stages have been noted. 8 Few appellate courts have flatly stated that
the defendant must be represented, but appellate courts are prone to
reverse in cases in which there was no representation and, in so doing,
set standards for the denial of counsel which as a practical matter trial
courts cannot meet." It then becomes obvious to the trial courts of
the jurisdiction that the appellate court does not want a defendant tried
without counsel. 4°  This reinforces the natural inclination of the trial
judge to appoint counsel and further undermines the assumption that
counsel are appointed only for "indigents."
Criminal defense work is now largely socialized, and the practical
38. See notes 8 & 9 supra and accompanying text.
39. The appellate courts reverse where there is a summary proceeding and, in so
doing, require an in-depth inquiry in which doubtful questions are resolved in favor
of the applicant-the kind of inquiry this Article contends to be inherently impractical.
In Wood v. United States, 389 U.S. 20 (1967), the Court reversed per curiam a convic-
tion where the trial court had denied appointment under the Criminal Justice Act of
1964 after questioning the petitioner on his affidavit. The Court held that the record
did not convincingly show an adequate inquiry into the defendant's financial ability
to retain counsel. In State v. Owen, 97 Ariz. 250, 399 P.2d 660 (1965), the court
held that the trial judge could not elect to disbelieve the defendant's affidavit and sworn
testimony in the absence of evidence to the contrary. In People v. Gillespie, 41 Mich.
App. 748, 201 N.W.2d 104 (1972), the court reversed a conviction and directed that
counsel be appointed for a defendant who had been making $7000 per year but was
on sick leave and drawing only $80 per week at the time of the hearing. The record
showed the defendant to be married without children and in the process of obtaining
a divorce. He was free on a $1500 bond. The appellate court held that the record
was ambiguous and that ambiguities had to be resolved in favor of the defendant.
Rather than remand for a hearing to resolve the ambiguities, however, the court or-
dered the trial court to appoint counsel. One judge dissented on this point. Other
cases in which an appellate court has reversed for the failure of the trial court to hold
a comprehensive inquiry are United States v. Cohen, 419 F.2d 1124 (8th Cir. 1969),
and State v. Harris, 5 Conn. Cir. 313, 250 A.2d 719 (1968).
40. In People v. Chism, 17 Mich. App. 196, 169 N.W.2d 192 (1969), the appellate
court flatly held that one charged with murder who asked for the assistance of counsel
could not be forced to trial in propria persona.
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operation of our criminal justice system would hardly be altered if it
were acknowledged that the state will provide an attorney for anyone
who wanted one. The total criminal caseload would be the same.
The percentage of cases defended at public expense would increase
somewhat, but costs should not increase accordingly, because it could
be expected that the admission that criminal defense work had become
socialized would result in more defender offices and fewer appointed
counsel systems. Defender offices are more efficient than appointive
systems in all but the most sparsely populated parts of the country.A
The admission that the defender was available to everyone would in-
jure the private practitioner somewhat, but not as much as might be
expected. Few private attorneys derive a substantial part of their in-
come from criminal law,42 and of those who do it is fair to say there
are two types: a highly skilled elite and a group of hangers-on more
skilled in extorting a fee from their clients than in anything else.4 '
The elite, because of skill, reputation, and personal attention to their
clients, will always be retained by those who can afford them.44  The
hangers-on would be injured, but it is widely assumed that a defendant
in the hands of one of these lawyers not only is paying for his repre-
sentation but also is receiving counsel of a substantially lower quality than
is afforded by the public defender's office. Private attorneys who take
criminal cases rarely might suffer some loss of income, although it can
41. Silverstein postulated that the defender system becomes more economical at a
population level of 400,000. SILvERSTEwn 63. The figure should be much lower today
because of the extension of the right to counsel to misdemeanants. Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). The evidence is that defender systems are more econom-
ical because of specialization and the elimination of waiting-time duplication. Legal
Manpower Needs 406-07. A North Carolina survey showed the per-case cost of as-
signed counsel to be roughly twice that of the public defender. 49 N.C.L. REv.
705, 709 (1971).
An attractive feature of a defender system is the availability of the defender at the
early stages of a case. OAKS REPORT 134. The sooner counsel is appointed, the
greater the possibility that an appropriate case can be diverted out of the criminal sys-
tem. REPoRT To THE NATIONAL DEFENDER CONFERENCE 23.
42. In 1966 it was estimated that only between 2000 and 5000 lawyers of the na-
tion's 300,000 lawyers served more than occasionally as retained defense counsel. Le-
gal Manpower Needs 394.
43. ABA REPORT 25; REPORT TO THE NATIONAL DEFENDER CONFERENCE 33.
44. It is assumed that a person of means would pay to be represented by a private
attorney of his choice rather than be represented by a competent but impersonal de-
fender. Oaks suggests that a highly successful defender organization could develop a
reputation superior even to highly skilled private practitioners and that defendants
would then opt, if possible, for the defender, monetary considerations aside. OAKs RE-
PORT 186.
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be argued that the attorney who is only rarely consulted on a criminal
case should refer the case to a specialist. The impact on this type
of practitioner should not be substantial, as the vast majority of crim-
inal defense cases are handled by appointed counsel or private practi-
tioners specializing in criminal work.
In 1970 Chief Justice Burger, commenting on the work of the ABA
Advisory Committee, compared the criminal justice system to a three-
legged stool, one leg the judge, the second leg the prosecution, and
the third leg the defense lawyer: "We concluded very quickly that
that third leg in this context was as essential as the third leg of a
stool. We have not quite said it ought to be jurisdictional that you
have three parts to this enterprise but we have come very, very close
to it."4 5  It is time to admit the overriding social need for attorney
representation and to abandon the notion that our courts are, or should
be, screening the non-indigent before appointment of counsel. On
several occasions the leaders of criminal justice thinking in this country
have suggested or intimated that we will ultimately come to socializa-
tion of the defense function.46 Socialization is a pejorative word in
this country. Let us simply admit that we need the defense lawyer,
are willing to pay the public cost, and, while we will accept a contribu-
tion from the defendant, we are not going to worry about whether
he might be able to hire his own lawyer, and stop telling defendants
that next term of court they will be tried "with or without a lawyer."
45. 31st D.C. Judicial Conference 40.
46. ALLEN REPORT 32; Legal Manpower Needs 396; 31st D.C. Judicial Conference
45. All note the Scandinavian system, where generally there is an attempt to force
contribution only after trial and conviction. It would be unfair to seek contribution
for a state expense from a man judged innocent. See E. CAHm, THE PREnrcAmENr
oF MODERN MAN 51-52 (1964).
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